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1On transmission and coordination
under flexible exchange rates*
W. MAX CORDEN
This paper considers the need for macroeconomic policy coordination
under flexible exchange rates and the nature of the equilibria that may be
reached in the absence of coordination. It was inspired by the extensive
discussions that have taken place on the need for coordination, and
especially by the so-called 'locomotive theory' of the late nineteen
seventies, which suggested that coordinated expansion would be easier th
than expansion by any one country on its own. Essentially, the initial model ex
presented here is a formalisation of popular arguments that lack of
coordination of macroeconomic policies leads to more deflation than
would an efficient or optimally coordinated set of policies. The model
includes a short-term non-vertical Phillips curve —andhence assumes that G
macroeconomic management can affect employment and output. Ia
The main model is presented in Part I. This is a condensation of Corden P
(1983b), where the model and its implications are spelt out in more detail, a:
Part!! analyses in detail a qualification that seems important, namely that P
one country needs to take into account the possible future adverse effects
on itself of increased inflation in the other country. This qualification, 9
which was only briefly discussed in Corden (1983b), involves intertemporal
considerations that are ignored in the short-term (and short-sighted)
approach of Part I.Finally, Part III both extends and qualifies the
discussion. It is argued that the main model may be more relevant for a an
world of many countries, even though the formal model is a two-country 9
model. On the other hand, the limitations of the whole short-term
approach are also noted. In addition, the effects of introducing international
capital movements are sketched out.'
I A two-country model of macroeconomic policy interaction ci
We now build a simple two-country model, beginning with one of the T
countries, Germany. The analysis will be completely symmetrical, so that C'
8the foundations also apply to the other country, the United States. The
exchange rate floats and there are no international capital movements.2
Therealwage, employment and the terms of trade
The German production function and capital stock are given.
German employment, N9 varies so as to equate the marginal product of
labor with the real wage in terms of Germany's own product, i.e. the
product real wage, R9. The German terms of trade are T, an increase being
an improvement. The crucial distinction must then be made between the
product real wage, R9 and the income real wage, where=
(R9, T). The income real wage reflects the consumption basket of wage
earners and isthe nominal wage deflated by a price index of the
home-produced and the imported good. For a given R9, an improvement
in the terms of trade would raise
Figure 1.1 shows the German income real wage,on the vertical axis
and German employment, N9 on the horizontal. MM is the marginal
product of labor curve, drawn for constant terms of trade, T. A movement
down the curve results from a fall in R9, which (with T constant) causes
to fall. An improvement in the terms of trade would shift the curve
upwards.
The curve HH is drawn for a constant level of United States output (and
employment). It shows that, with US output given, an increase in German
employment would involve a deterioration in the German terms of trade.
The reason is that, with US output given, the US offer curve facing
Germany is given, and the increase in German employment —whichshifts
H'



































a . 4- -
10 W. Max Corden
the German offer curve outwards —willinvolve a movement along the US
offer curve.
A rise in US output is represented by a shift of the HH curve to H'H'.
If, at the same time, German employment expanded from g0 to g2 the terms
of trade would stay constant and the German income real wage would fall
fromto W. This is the special case of a mutually balanced expansion.
Another special case is where the German income real wage is rigid. An
expansion of US output would then lead to a rise in German employment
from g0 to g1.
We have assumed that a rise in US output improves the German terms
of trade by shifting the US offer curve outwards, and that this, in turn raises
the income real wage for given German employment. Hence the HH curve
shifts to the right. This result follows from a model where each country
is assumed to produce only one product (or, in a multi-product model,
where the factor intensities do not differ much). It can be called the
assumption of positive transmission and will be reconsidered at the end of
Part II.
The real wage gap and the Phillips curve
The next step is to derive what is essentially a short-run non-vertical dr
Phillips curve. pd
The curve VV traces out the target real wage at various levels of is
employment. For any given level of employment it shows the income real so
wage at which the labor market is in equilibrium in the special sense that th
the trade unions (or others who determine wages) are satisfied with the real
wage at that level of employment, even though there are potential workers dr
involuntarily unemployed. It represents the target of the unions, not of the sh
government, in
For any given level of employment there can be a real wage gap, namely
a divergence between the target real wage and the actual real wage. The
latter is assumed to determine the actual level of employment, the product
market always being in equilibrium even though the labor market is not.
At employment g1 the real wage gap with the original level of US output Go
is FE. The increase in US output lowers the real wage gap at that level g1
of employment to FE'.
We now assume that the actual real wage can be brought below the target col.
real wage (at least during the short period concerned) by continuous price
inflation above the initial rate of inflation. Price inflation can bring about
this real wage gap because of sluggishness of nominal wage adjustment,
nominal wages lagging behind prices, the lag increasing with the rate of
price inflation. The greater the required real wage gap, the greater price an









• 1.2 Germanpolicy choices when US expands
Df
increase in the rate of growth of nominal demand (rate of growth of the
money supply when velocity is constant).
Obviously this is a short-term analysis, subject to all the limitations of
-al drawing a fixed non-vertical Phillips curve. Letbe the rate of German
price inflation and ii' the rate ofGerman nominal wage increase. The idea
is that a rise in j3 over the period leads to a temporary rise over
al so thatfalls by a given amount over the period; this implies that by
at the end of the periodhascaught up with j3.
al Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between j3 and Ng. The curve RR is
rs drawn for the initial level of US output. It is a kind of Phillips curve,
showing how German employment rises as the rate of German price
inflation rises during the period. Inflationfor example creates a real
ly wage gap FE and so yields employment g1. The initial rate of inflation
(perhaps determined by given expectations of nominal demand growth)
yielded a zero real wage gap, and hence employment g0. The rise in US
t. • output(and hence improvement in the German terms of trade for given
.it German employment) shifts the RR curve to R'R'. German employment
el g1 can now be sustained with a lower real wage gap FE' and hence lower
rate of inflationThe next step is to introduce the usual social welfare
et contours allowing the selection of optimal points on the two 'Phillips
curves'. If the original point A was an optimal point, the new one is likely
Ut to be south-east of A, say at Z, representing the idea that the gains from
it, US expansion will be taken out in Germany partly by reduced inflation
of and partly by extra employment. Through this German policy reaction,
ce an increase in US employment thus leads also to a rise in German
employment.The policy reaction curves
In Figure 1.3 GG is the German policy reaction curve. It shows
the level of German employment, N9 brought about by nominal demand
management in Germany for every given level of US employment,
Every point on GG represents an optimal point (from the point of view
of German policy-makers) on a German short-term Phillips curve. A
movement upwards on GG (say from A to Z,equivalentto movements
from A to ZinFigures 1.1 and 1.2) is associated with an improvement
in the German terms of trade, a rise in the German income real wage, a
fall in the German product real wage, and a fall in the German rate of
inflation.
Following exactly the same principles, one can draw a US policy
reaction curve UU, showing how US employment rises as German
employment rises, each point on UU being an optimal point on a US
Phillips curve, with German employment regarded as given.
Before making use of these reaction curves to analyse the two countries'
policy interactions we might note that there are three distinct reasons why
the German curve is steeper than the United States one —threefactors that
ensure (each factor on its own) stability and uniqueness of the Nash





































Ontransmission and coordination 13
employment in each country owing to the fixity of the capital stocks, (2)
an increase in the target real wage as employment increases, and (3) a
reduction in the rate of price inflation as employment increases. In the
absence of all three factors in both countries the two reaction curves would
coincide with AQ,onecountry's expansion eliciting expansion by the other
country along the balanced expansion (constant terms of trade) path. The
presence of at least one of these factors in at least one country is sufficient
for the analysis to follow.
Non-cooperative equilibria
If there were indeed non-cooperative behaviour based on the
myopic assumption that the other country's output would stay fixed, the
Nash equilibrium at A would be attained. The USA would always move
vertically towards UU and Germany would move horizontally towards
GG. Each country would have its target, UU and GG, and its proximate
I instrument, and N9 —inturn determined by adjusting nominal demand
via monetary and fiscal policies. The assignment of instrument to target
would be stable.
The levels of social welfare attained are indicated by the two indifference
curves through A, uu tracing out equal social welfare for the USA (any
curve to the right representing an improvement), and gg tracing out
constant social welfare for Germany, (higher curves representing an
improvement). It is apparent that a move to any point on these curves up
ws to C, or within the area enclosed by uu and gg, would be a Pareto-
nd improvement. Thus, while the Nash equilibrium is stable, it is not Pareto
efficient. The Nash equilibrium has a contractionary bias, in the sense that
both countries could be better off if, within limits, they both expanded
A beyond that equilibrium.
Alternatively, a non-cooperative equilibrium might be attained through
nt policy leadership by one country. Germany might react to US policy by
a taking US output as given, so staying on GG, while the United States
of adjusted its policy so as to attain the optimal point for it on GG. This would
yield the equilibrium at Z. This is Pareto-superior to A, but
cy still has some contractionary bias, because mutual expansion from Z could
an lead to Pareto-improvements.
JS Special note might be taken of the balanced expansion path AQ along
which the terms of trade stay constant. Along this path neither country
es' can be compensated by a terms of trade improvement for the adverse
hy movement in its product real wage resulting from expansion, so that the
iat two income real wages must fall. Along this path neither country is
ish 'beggaring its neighbour' for the sake of restraining domestic price
tra inflation. A non-cooperative equilibrium might be attained through policy
a14 W. Max Corden
leadership where the reactive country, Germany, aims to keep the terms at
of trade constant, while the USA chooses an optimal point given this co
reaction. AQ then becomes Germany's reaction curve and the USA will
choose point F.
It cannot, of course, be assumed that non-cooperative behaviour would
lead to any of the results just discussed. In particular, the Nash equilibrium It
implies myopia. The question then is whether there are any general rules
to constrain non-cooperative behaviour that are likely to have favorable
results. One might be called the unilateral expansion rule and seems, at first th
sight, plausible. Wherever countries find themselves initially, they may fo
expand, but may not contract. The point is that one country's contraction itr.
always has an adverse effect on the other, so this rule ensures that any a
voluntary change is a Pareto improvement. A country will expand only if ar
this would benefit itself, and such expansion must also benefit the other ofl
country. This rule would limit equilibria to somewhere on or within the ir
cone GA U (above A). Such a rule might need to be supplemented by an w
agreement for coordinated contraction when both desire this.
Policy coordination
The scope for policy coordination is obvious. In Figure 1.3 JJ
traces out points of tangency of the indifference curves. This is the
Pareto-efficiency locus. It divides the cone GA U referred to above into an
upper and a lower part. If the countries are not on this locus they can, ra
by mutual arrangement, always achieve a Pareto-improvement. This could
be brought about by both expanding (if they start in the lower part of the
cone), both contracting (starting in the upper part), or one expanding and
the other contracting (possibly required if starting outside the cone). in
Starting at A it is apparent that there is much scope for a joint expansion re
that yields a Pareto improvement. In fact, a movement to any point in
enclosed by the two indifference curves through A will make them both
better off. As long as they are not on JJ there is always scope for a
Pareto-improvement. ml
Conceivably the starting point might be at a point such as F*, a case
of mutual over-expansion. Joint contraction can then bring about
improvements for both. Contraction by one country will always have an
F adverseeffect on the other country, but the losses for the other country
are in this case outweighed by the gains from its own contraction. The
common view, also stated earlier in this paper, that non-coordination is
acontractionary bias, implies that coordination to obtain cd.
a Pareto-improvement calls for mutual expansion. The implicit assumption
is that, in the absence of coordination, the Nash or Stackelberg equilibria fo































On transmission and coordination 15
attain a Pareto improvement may require contraction by one or both
countries.
II Intertemporal effects
It has been assumed that one country, say the USA, balances the favorable
current output effects of an expansion against the unfavorable inflation
effects. But the transmission to the other country, Germany, is purely
through the output effect, which, if the transmission is positive, is favorable
for Germany. US inflation has no effect on Germany, which can insulate
itself from foreign inflation with a flexible exchange rate. Put another way,
a US expansion has a favorable real and an unfavorable nominal effect,
and only the real effect is transmitted to Germany. Thus it is in the interests
of each country that the other country expands as much as possible
irrespective of the inflationary effects in the other country, and, from a
world point of view, each should expand more than if it considered only
its own interest. This sums up the 'locomotive argument' for coordination,
which has been formalised in this paper. But there is a difficulty in this
approach.
Adverse future effects of foreign inflation
There is no reason why a country should regard an increase in its
rate of inflation as adverse if this is never expected to have any real effects.
Presumably an increase in current inflation (or in future inflation stimulated
perhaps by an increase in inflationary expectations now) is thought adverse
because it is expected to have adverse real effects of some kind. An increase
in inflation may be thought to lead to accelerating inflationary expectations,
requiring increased inflation to maintain employment; and increasing
inflation may have adverse effects on productivity for given employment.
In addition, to prevent inflation getting out of hand, employment may
eventually have to be reduced for some time. But these futurerealeffects
in the USA of a rise in current US inflation would spill over to Germany
in the usual way through the terms of trade. Hence, Germany should expect
to lose later from current US expansion.
Current welfare and future welfare
Itis thus necessary to introduce an explicitly intertemporal
analysis. As before, we begin with the case of Germany, the analysis being
completely symmetrical.
First we set out an equation for current German welfare,and then
for expected future German welfare, Z1. This refers to 'welfare' as
perceived by the German authorities. We assume thatdepends not only
ms
his
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on current German employment, N9 but also on the terms of trade for given
employment, an improvement in the terms of trade raising German real
incomes. An increase in US employment,improves the German terms
of trade (by shifting the US offer curve outwards), and so raises German
welfare. Hence
Z,,= >0, >0 (1)
Note that the current German rate of inflation does not have any direct
effect on current German welfare. Furthermore, we are ruling out im-
miserizing growth. This would mean that an increase in German employ-
ment, and hence output, would worsen the terms of trade sufficiently for
German welfare to decline.
Next, we set out an equation for expected future German welfare, Zf.
Firstly, it depends negatively on current German inflationSecondly,
it depends negatively on current US inflation,The mechanism of the
latter relationship is that current US inflation is expected to reduce US
output and employment in the future, hence shift the US offer curve
inwards, and so —assumingpositive transmission —lowerGerman welfare It
in the future.
Z1 =Z1(j39, Z11 <0,Z12<0 (2)
The next step is to bring in the German Phillips curve equation. Current is
German employment, N9 is related positively to current German inflation,
an increase in both being brought about by nominal demand expansion,
and to US employment (which determines the US offer curve). We no in
longer assume automatically that a rise in US employment must inevitably w
lead to a policy response in Germany that raises German employment. It
will be shown below that a rational policy response could lead to negative A
employment transmission.
N0 = N91 > 0, N020 (3) trl
Finally,we bring in an equation for total welfare, Z which depends
inthe two periods. cu
Z= Z1)Z1 > 0, Z2 > 0 (4)
How US expansion affects German welfare: positive and
negative total transmission
Let us first represent the system for the special case of Part I of JsJ
this paper where Z12 =0(i.e. future German welfare does notdependon b
current US inflation), in















•Ifare It represents the German Phillips curve, a movement along it to the left
being brought about by nominal demand expansion in Germany which
raises German employment (hence raising current welfare, andraises
•(2) German inflation (hence lowering future welfare, Zf).Thestarting point
•rent is A, assumed to be the optimal point.
tion, A rise in US employment, shifts the curve outwards to Q'Q'by
raisingforany given Z1(i.e.for any given 13g).Assumingthat the gain
e no in welfare possibilities is taken out partly in the form of a rise in future
ably welfare,willhave to fall (this being the only way in which future welfare
it. It can be raised at this stage) and equilibrium will be at a point such as D.
itive At this stage there is clearly a rise in total welfare (move to a higher
indifference curve) so we can say that there has been positive total
transmission of US expansion.
(3) The rise in US employment, will be associated with a rise in US
ends inflation, Weassume now that the USA has moved along its Phillips
curve for given German employment, and we introduce the new element
in the story: the rise inhasan adverse effect on expected future welfare
/ inGermany, i.e. Z12 <0. This is represented by a movement to the left
of the Q'Q'curveto YY. For any given level ofthere is a fall in Z1.
If Ng andstayed at the level that had yielded D, the point D' on YY
would be reached (i.e. there would be no change in current welfare since
I of Ng would not change). But the optimal point on YY could be above or
d on below U. This optimal point in Figure 1.4 is at E, and is the result of an
income effect, which has reducedand Z1 below the level at D, and a
substitution effect, which has shifted welfare towards Z,,. Compared with
Y Q Q Z1
I .4 A case of negative total transmission18 W. MaxCorden
D, Zf must fall, while Z,, could rise or fall. Compared with A, the initial
equilibrium,and Z1 could have risen or fallen.
The move from A to D raised total welfare, Z and the further move to
E lowered it. In Figure 1.4 the net result has been to lower it (the
indifference curve through E being below that through A), so that there
is negative total transmission, in the sense that an increase in employment
in the USA has lowered total welfare of Germany once the expected
adverse effect on Germany of the rise in US inflation is taken into account.
It is thus in Germany's interest to discourage US expansion.
There could, of course, be positive total transmission, and this seems
much more probable. The less Germany expects her terms of trade to be
affected by changes in future US productivity or employment, and the more
Germany discountsthefuture,the more likelyispositivetotal
transmission.
Negative employment transmission
The effect of a rise inon German welfare is distinct from the
effect on German employment. Itis just conceivable that German
employment Ng declines when rises. This is negative employment
transmission. There are two reasons why this is possible.
(1) The rise inraises current German welfare,for given German
employment. While it also lowers 1g for given German employment, and
so raises Z1, it may be desired to shift more of the welfare gain into the
future, so that there would be a movement along the Phillips curve
designed to lower jog further, and so lower German employment. Thus at
D in Figure 1.4 N9 could have fallen relative to A.
(2) If the optimal point E on YY is below D' (as in Figure 1.4) the
adverse future effect of the rise in j3,, will have induced a movement along
the German Phillips curve designed to shift some of this adverse effect into
the present by lowering N9 and j39. The essential argument is that the
expected future adverse effect of US inflation would be partially offset by
a reduction in current German inflation, this bringing about a fall in
German employment. Going right back to Figure 1.2, this means that the
optimal point Z on the new Phillips curve R'R' could be to the left of Ag0.
Effects on two-country interaction
The question now is how these intertemporal considerations affect
the two-country interaction model represented by Figure 1.3.
This model was based on two assumptions. (1) There was positive total
transmission, expansion by one country always raising the welfare of the
other, assuming the latter has made an optimal adjustment. This meant
that welfare of both countries could be improved by movements upwards
1!!.On transmission and coordination 19
and to the right of A; in other words, a cooperative solution designed to
yield a Pareto-improvement would involve mutual expansion relative to
the Nash solution. (2) There was positive employment transmission,
employment expansion by one country leading to employment expansion
•e by the other along its reaction curve. Hence both reaction curves were
it positively sloped, and for reasons specified, the non-cooperative Nash
d solution was stable.
We have seen that, once intertemporal effects are introduced, there may
stillbe both positivetotaltransmission and positive employment
transmission. In that case the interaction model of Part I, and with it
Figure 1.3, are fully applicable.
It remains to allow for (I) negative total transmission and (2) negative
• employment transmission. We shall consider here only each on its own,
always assuming the other is positive, and that negative transmission
between countries goes in both directions. Mixed cases can be easily
worked out.
(1) If there is negative total transmission the reaction curves will have
n the same slopes and characteristics as before (because employment
transmission is still positive). But the indifference curves in Figure 1.3 will
be bowed the opposite way and welfare will rise with movements downGG
and UU. The Pareto-efficiency curve, JJ' will be below A, so that
d Pareto-improvements can result from mutual contraction when the Nash
equilibrium is the starting point.
(2) If there is negative employment transmission the reaction curves will
be negatively sloped. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium could be unstable.
But, given that positive total transmission remains, Pareto-improvements
relative to the Nash equilibrium would still be obtainable from coordinated
mutual expansion.
Positive and negative transmission again
At the beginning of this paper it was noted that the assumption
of positive transmission was being made, namely that expansion by one
country not only improved the other's terms of trade but also that this
raised the other's income real wage for any given level of employment. This
assumption was summed up in Figure 1.1 by the movement to the right
of the HHcurve (to H'H') as a result of US expansion. We have also made
the assumption that such positive transmission is expected to apply in the
future —i.e.that a productivity decline in the USA would worsen Germany's
terms of trade and shift its HH curve adversely.
Here two observations must be made. The first is that such positive
transmission in each separate period can still be compatible both with
negative total transmission and with negative employment transmission. In20 W. Max Corden
fact, in the cases that have just been discussed, this has been so. Positive
transmission in the future has accounted for the inward, movement of the
YY curve in Figure 1.4 which —ifit goes far enough (i.e. the adverse
productivity effect of a rise in ishigh and positive transmission is
high) —maylead to negative total transmission. In addition, we have
represented the case where more than the whole of a favourable effect from
US expansion (movement to the right of the HH curve in Figure 1.1 or
of RR in Figure 1.2) is taken out in lower inflation, with employment
actually declining.
The second observation is that the assumption of positive transmission
in each period cannot be taken for granted. It is conceivable that a US 1.
expansionshifts the HH curve in Figure 1.1 to the left. Such a possibility
of negative transmission has been analysed in detail in Corden and
Turnovsky (1983). 4
Eithera US expansion might worsen the German terms of trade (if the
US expansion is sufficiently anti-trade biased) or an improvement of the
German terms of trade might shift the HH curve to the left because
Germany exports products which are non-labor intensive. (A better
example is an improvement in the Australian terms of trade, which raises
food prices and so lowers the income real wage for given employment).
In these cases the purely static model of Part I would yield negative
employment transmission. On the other hand, if there is negative trans-
mission in the future, then in the intertemporal model Germany would
expect to gain in the future from a rise in current US inflation, provided
the latter is expected to have an adverse effect on US productivity
employment.
Ill Beyond the model
Let us now briefly consider three matters that go beyond the particular
short-term two-country model presented here.
A world of many countries
In a two-country setting, the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
imply either policy rigidities or some kind of myopia. The actual solutions
must be regarded as indeterminate until further considerations from game
theory are introduced. While presented here in a two-country framework,
the analysis actually seems to be more 'relevant for a many-country model.
The various countries must not be 'small' in the formal sense —i.e.they
must be able to affect their terms of trade by their own economic
expansion. Rut they must not be so large that they expect policy reactions
from other countries. Such a world would then lead to a multi-country
'-
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Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is thus interesting because it may
• comeclose to describing the non-coordination outcome in a world of many
: countries.Alternatively, all countries other than the United States might
be regarded as ignoring reactions, in which case the Stackelberg equilibrium
e is a reasonable representation of the non-coordination outcome.
r Limitaflons of short-term approach
The short-term nature of the whole approach should not be
• forgotten. The Phillips curve is not vertical in the model, and it is not even
expectations-augmented. Because the analysis is short-term —andseeks to
s representideas that have come from short-term macro-economic policy
discussion —onemay be justified in assuming that one country does not
expect a reaction from the other country when making its own policy
decisions. But probably one would not be justified in building a structure
e of sophisticated game theory on top of the simple model. In fact, it is to
e be questioned whether a time-consuming international coordination process
e could possibly be justified when the underlying variables —notablythe
r Phillips curve —arelikely to be rapidly shifting. Futhermore, these very
shifts may be influenced by the extensive policy discussions which are
bound to precede successful international co-operation.
•e At this point one should consider more precisely the implications of the
- Phillipscurve gradually becoming vertical as expectations adjust —i.e.as
•j nominalwages cease to lag behind prices. Macroeconomic demand policy
I will lose its efficacy, and unions will attain their target real wages (stay on
r VV in Figure 1.1). Assuming positive transmission through the terms of
trade, in each country employment will increase when the other country
expands (as a result of a fall in the target real wage or as a result of a
productivity improvement). Thus there will still be two positively-sloped
reaction curves in Figure 1.3, and the interaction between the trade unions
in the two countries will establish the Nash equilibrium. But it will be
beyond the power of governments, whether acting independently or in
coordination, to alter this.
Capital market interaction
It is an obvious limitation of the model that it has ruled out any
capital market interaction. I shall now spell out informally how this could
be introduced. Let us assume that each country manages its aggregate
demand policy in the light of the considerations discussed in the paper so
far. But a given level of aggregate demand can be obtained by various mixes
of monetary and fiscal policy. We shall now hold aggregate demand in each
country for its domestic products constant, but vary the policy mix so as
to attain various interest rate outcomes.22 W.Max Corden
Since the interest rate will be determined in the world capital market,
the effects of a change in the US policy mix will depend also on the German
policy mix reaction. Hence a change in what will be called here an 'interest
rate policy' in one country is really a change in its net demand for tradeable
bonds —i.e.a shift in a net demand curve. Let us now suppose that the
USA shifts the mix towards fiscal expansion (and hence monetary
contraction, to maintain aggregate demand constant). This reduces its net
demand for bonds (or raises its supply) and then brings about reactions
in Germany both from the private sector and through a possible change
in government policy. We can assume that each government has a reaction
function of some kind. One might expect that an increase in the US supply
of bonds (tending to raise the world interest rate with a given German N
budget deficit) would lead to a reduction in the German budget deficit as
borrowing becomes more expensive (i.e. there is a movement down the
German government's bond supply curve). In this way a non-coordination
equilibrium could, in principle, be attained as each country makes some
assumption about the other's policy, one case being the special assumption
that the other's policy stays unchanged, leading to a Nash equilibrium.3
The next step is to look at the sign of total transmission. Does a shift
to the right of the US supply curve of bonds (brought about, for example,
by a US fiscal expansion) benefit or harm Germany? Suppose itis
perceived to harm Germany. Then it will be in Germany's interest to induce
the USA to engage in some fiscal contraction, always associated with
monetary expansion. If it were true that each country is harmed by a policy
shift in the other country that tends to raise the interest rate, then
coordination designed to yield a Pareto improvement would involve both
countries engaging in fiscal contraction and monetary expansion. The
Nash equilibrium would yield too high a world interest rate from a world
Pareto-efficiency point of view.
But this leaves open the question whether Germany is benefited or
harmed by a high interest rate policy in the USA. The answer is not
obvious. It must depend, among other things, on whether Germany is a H
net creditor or debtor. Yet the answer is crucial in determining the
direction in which a Pareto-improving co-ordination arrangement would
shift the system.
One aspect —butonly one aspect —isthe terms of trade effect. This must
be superimposed on the terms of trade effects of changes in aggregate
demand which are central to the main analysis in this paper. It is likely
that a shift to a high interest rate policy in the USA would worsen the
German terms of trade, at least for the period of time during which this
policy gives rise to additional capital flows from Germany to the USA.
This German terms of trade deterioration would be part of the mechanismOn transmission and coordination 23
by which a German current account surplus (equal to the capital account
deficit) is generated. It is a cost of the 'transfer'.
In the main model of thispaper the terms of trade were the only
mechanism of transmission between countries. Any US policy that
worsened the German terms of trade was then definitely adverse in its effect
on German welfare. But, once capital flows and stocks of international
debts are allowed for, this is no longer so. For example, if Germany is a
net creditor at a floating interest rate, she will gain on that account from
a US high interest rate policy.
NOTES
*Thispaper is closely related to a earlier paper, namely Corden (1983b). Part 1
is a summary of the earlier paper and some passages there and elsewhere are
taken verbatim from this paper. The main addition here is the detailed
e argument of Part II. In the preparation of the earlier paper and revisions of
it I have benefited from comments by John Black, Peter Kenen and Ben Smith.
1There is a modest literature in this general area. All the interdependence issues
are surveyed in Cooper (1984), which contains many references. On the
t international transmission process through the terms of trade under flexible
exchange rates, see especially Hamada and Sakurai (1978), Mussa (1979) and
s Corden and Turnovsky (1983).
2 Canzoneri and Gray (1983), Sachs (1983) and Cooper (1984, sec. 5) deal with
the flexible exchange rate two-country interaction case along somewhat similar
lines as the present paper (as represented by Figures1.3), though the
microfoundations differ. Note that international capital movements are intro-
duced in Part III of the present paper.
3 This type of argument, that there is an international laissez-faire system where
governments are actors (and possibly are interest-rate responsive), and that
variations in the interest rate help to attain equilibrium, is set out more fully
in Corden (1983a).
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COMMENT DALE W. HENDERSON
I Introduction
It is very appropriate to have Max Corden's paper as the first
paper in the volume. First, Corden uses static game theory to analyze the
strategy of macroeconomic policymaking in a two-country world economy
under flexible exchange rates. His analysis is illustrative of the approach
that has been adopted by several authors over the last fifteen years. Then,
he introduces intertemporal effects into his analysis. By conveying to the
reader the reasons for his obvious impatience with the limitations of static
analysis, Corden sets the stage for the more elaborate dynamic analyses
that appear later in the volume.
The remainder of this comment is divided into two parts. The first part
is an attempt to formalize Corden's graphical analysis. The second
contains some general comments on Corden's paper.
II A formalization of Corderi's analysis
This part of the comment contains a mathematical analysis of
macroeconomic in a two-country world economy that is very
similar to Corden's graphical analysis. The two countries are called the
home country and the foreign country. Variables with asterisks are foreign
country variables.
Each country is specialized in producing one good. According to the
production functions, (logarithms of) outp'its (y, y*) are increasing
functions of (logarithms of) employments (.1,n")and productivity dis-
turbances (x, x*):
y=k1+zn+x O<a<l (1)
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It is assumed that the productivity disturbances and the other disturbance
1, terms introduced below have zero means and are identically and inde-
pendently distributed.
Labor is employed up to the point at which (logarithms of) real wages




Realwages are equal to (logarithms of) nominal wages (w, w*) minus
(logarithms of) product prices (s, s*). Marginal products are decreasing
functions of employments and increasing functions of productivity
disturbances.
Before markets meet each period, workers and firms enter into contracts
that specify nominal wages and employment rules. Each period the
monetary authorities announce (logarithms of) money supplies that they
will make available if all disturbances are zero (rn,ma).Using this
information, workers and firms set nominal wages at the values
St that will be consistent with 'full employment' levels of employment (ff, n*)





Workers agree to supply whatever quantity of labor firms want at the
realized real wage.
The market for home goods is in equilibrium when the supply of the
home good is equal to world demand:
d O<y<l (7)
World demand for the home good depends positively on home income,
(the logarithm of) foreign income, (the logarithm of) the relative price of
f the foreign good (q), and a goods demand disturbance (u). The relative
price of the foreign good (the terms of trade) is given by
e q=e+s*_s, (8)
I
where e is (the logarithm of) the exchange rate expressed as the home
e currency price of foreign currency.
g It is assumed that there is no capital mobility. Therefore, income must
- beidentically equal to spending in each country, and world income must
always be identical to world spending. Consequently, equilibrium in the
home goods market implies equilibrium in the foreign goods market.
Consumer price indices or CPIs (p, p*) are weighted averages of the
prices of home and foreign goods:








It is assumed that (logarithms of) velocities (v, v*) are disturbance terms
with the same properties as the other disturbance terms. Closing the model
with equations (11) and (12) is in the spirit of Corden's analysis. He never
mentions interest rates in the discussion based on his model.
It is convenient to express the model in terms of deviations of variables
from their full-employment values which are also their expected values.'
Variables with circumfiexes over them stand for deviations. Mathematical
representations of relationships similar to those graphed by Corden can
be distilled from the model:
=(I —/3)4—x, (13)
=(1 (14)




Equations (13) and (14) are curves.' Equation (13) can be
obtained by combining equations (3), (5), and the right-hand equality of
(9), all in deviation form; equation (14) can be obtained in an analogous
way.Withthe terms of trade unchanged= 0),positive deviations in
home employment (ii >0)must be accompanied by positive deviations in
the home product price (1> 0) and, therefore, positive deviations in the
home CPI (13> 0).With home employment and, therefore, the home
product price unchanged, positive deviations in the terms of trade (relative
price of the foreign good) cause positive deviations in the home CPI.
Positive productivity disturbances generate negative C?! deviations. The
Phillips curves of equations (13) and (14) relate CPI deviations to
employment deviations. Given Corden's definition of j3 as the rate of
inflation of the home CPI and his labeling of Figure 1.2, it might appear
that he has a different kind of Phillips curve in mind. However, his verbal
derivation of the Phillips curve is consistent with equations (13) and (14).
Equation (15) is the condition for equilibrium in the home goods
market. It is obtained by combining equations (1), (2), and (7) in deviation wOn transmission and coordination 27
9) form. Positive deviations in home employment and positive home pro-
ductivity disturbances createexcess supply;positivedeviationsin
foreign employment and in the terms of trade as well as positive foreign
ry productivity disturbances and goods demand disturbances create excess
demand.
1) Equations (16) and (17) state that sums of money supply deviations and
2
velocity disturbances determine employment deviations. Equation (16) can
be obtained by combining equations (1), (3), and (11) in deviation form;
ns equation (17) can be obtained in an analogous way. It is clear from
tel equations (16) and (17) that fiscal policy changes cannot affect employment.
er The qualitative effects of balanced budget increases in home government
spending would be identical to those of positive goods demand disturbances.
es Corden says that fiscal policy as well as monetary policy can be used to
affect employment. He probably has in mind a model different from the
al one used here.
It is assumed that the monetary authorities act on the basis of full
• information about the disturbances. Under this assumption, the monetary
3) authorities in each country can control the employment deviation in their
country. Therefore, equations(16) and (17) can be dropped and employment
4) deviations can be taken to be the instruments of the monetary authorities.
5) Nothing is lost by ignoring velocity disturbances. The authorities in each
country can offset the effect of these disturbances on employment in their
6) country without affecting the CPI in their country or employment or the
7) CPI in the other country.2




where o andmeasure the costs of squared deviations in CPIs relative
to squared deviations in employments. The monetary authorities in each
ie country maximize their utility with respect to their own employment
deviation taking the employment deviation of the monetary authorities in
the other country as given.
In order to simplify the analysis it is assumed that the two countries are
mirror images (9= = I—y =A,I —fl=fl*) andthat the
productivity disturbances in the two countries are the same (x =x*).
Under these assumptions the reduced forms for the CPI deviations are
al p= [(1_a)+c]n_en*_x_lfru, (20)
=—e,i+[(l (21)
where e = and=(1—fl)/8. Positive home employment deviations--












LA. INoncooperative equilibriumfollowinga world productivity rd
disturbance 01
lead to positive home CPI deviations both directly and indirectly through
induced rises inq. Negative world productivity disturbances cause
positive home CPI deviations directly. They have no indirect effects
through q under the mirror image assumption. Negative foreign employ-
ment deviations and goods demand disturbances generate positive CPI
deviations by raising q. The signs on the coefficients in equation (21) can
be explained in an analogous way. It is also assumed that the monetary
authorities in the two countries have identical tastes (o= o.*).
Itis clear from inspection of equations (20) and (21) that if there are
no disturbances, then there is no policy conflict. If xu= 0,setting
== 0yields j3 == 0,so both sets of monetary authorities can
attain bliss. According to the model of this comment, a policy conflict of
the kind depicted in Corden's Figure 1.3 would not arise unless the model
were subjected to some kind of disturbance. Corden does not say what kind
of disturbance if any is required to generate his policy conflict.
There is a disturbance that gives rise to a policy conflict like Corden's
in the model of this comment. Itis a negative world productivity •
disturbance(i <0). The effects of this disturbance are shown in
Figure 1.1. In the absence of the productivity disturbance, bliss for both '4
sets of monetary authorities is at point a0. Following a negative produc-
tivity disturbance, bliss for the home authorities is at point a1. They still
want a zero home employment deviation but now they want a positive r




0On transmission and coordination 29
would generate an appreciation of the home currency that would wipe out
the positive CPI deviation caused by the productivity disturbance.
For analogous reasons bliss for the foreign authorities is at point a2.
The home (authorities') reaction function (R) passes through a1, and the
foreign (authorities') reaction function (R*) passes through a2. The
reaction functions for the two sets of authorities are
=[(1 (22)(home)
= + ñ + + x
+oa2)] u (23)(foreign)
where=[(1 Both reaction functions have positive slopes, and
the slopes are the reciprocals of one another. The home reaction function
has a slope greater than one since> e. This result is intuitively appealing.
Starting at the bliss point for the home authorities, a positivelowers
utility by creating a negative ft.Thenegative ftcouldbe wiped out by a
positive ñ smaller than the original positivebecause ñ has a bigger effect
on j3. However, the home authorities would not increase ñ by enough to
restore j3 to its bliss value because increasing ñ has negative direct effect
on utility.
The noncooperative equilibrium is at point a3 where R and R* intersect.
.gh The noncooperative employment deviations (ñN, aregiven by
ise
cts == . (24)
where 4(1 + —(oep)2> 0. Therefore, the two identical employment
P1 deviations have the same sign as the productivity disturbance. Since the
an home reaction function was derived by setting the partial derivative of the
iry home authorities' utility function with respect to the home employment
deviation equal to zero =0),it cuts home indifference curves at
ire points at which their slopes are zero. The home indifference curve that
rig passes through a3 is UN. By an analogous argument, the foreign reaction
an function cuts foreign indifference curves at points at which their slopes are
of infinite. The foreign indifference curve that passes through a3 is It is
lel apparent that the welfare of both countries would be improved if they both
tid expanded. In mathematical terms, at a3
=e3U*/13ñ*=0 (26)
ty but 0U/0ñ* =3U*/ôñ=
m which is opposite in sign to the productivity disturbance. Thus, in the case
ic- of a negative world productivity disturbance, the noncooperative solution
till has a contractionary bias just like the noncooperative solution to the
ye policy conflict of Corden's Figure 1.3.
on However, in the case of a positive goods demand disturbance the
aIA.2Noncooperativeequilibriumfollowingagoods
disturbance
situation is somewhat different as shown in Figure 1A.2. Following the
disturbance, the bliss points for the home and foreign authorities are a1
and a2 respectively. The home authorities want a negative foreign
employment deviation to prevent a negative home CPI deviation, and the
foreign authorities want a positive home employment deviation to prevent
a positive foreign CPI deviation. The noncooperative equilibrium is at
point a3. Itis apparent that the welfare of both countries would be
improved if the home authorities expanded and the foreign authorities
contracted. Thus, in the case of a positive goods demand disturbance, the
noncooperative solution has a contractionary bias for the home country
and an expansionary bias for the foreign country. Whether or not the
noncooperative solution has a contractionary bias for either or both of the
two countries depends on the type of disturbance.
III Some general comments
In the model of this comment variations in today's money supply
have no intertemporal effects because nominal wages are only fixed for one
period, and all other variables are flexible. Of course, in a more complicated
model, for example one with multiperiod contracts, today's policy actions
would have intertemporal effects. Corden implements one possible ap-
proach to incorporating such effects. He assumes that some of today's








































tomorrow as well as the utility they experience today. This approach is
certainly unconventional and is probably not the best way to proceed. The
conventional approach is to specify the utility that the authorities experience
in each period as a function of that period's target variables and to take
account of intertemporal effects in the equations relating each period's
target variables to current, past, and expected future instrument variables.
Corden makes a number of interesting observations in implementing his
approach. However, he offers no convincing reasons for using his approach
instead of the more conventional one, which is employed in the other
dynamic analyses in the volume.
Corden concedes that the assumption of zero capital mobility limits the
applicability of his analysis. He then suggests a way of introducing capital
mobility. His approach involves adding fiscal policy to the list of policy
instruments. It is certainly possible to introduce capital mobility into the
analysis of macroeconomic policymaking in interdependent economies
without adding fiscal policy as shown by Canzoneri and Gray (1983).
Introducing capital mobility complicates the analysis substantially. In the
model of this comment, an increase in the home money supply has no effect
on foreign employment and lowers the foreign CPI. In a model in which
home currency and foreign currency securities are perfect substitutes, an
increase in the home money supply may increase or decrease both foreign
employment and the foreign CPI. Adding fiscal policy to a two-country
model with capital mobility complicates the analysis further. Counting
fiscal policy, each group of national authorities has two instruments. If
each group of national authorities also has only two target variables, for
example unemployment and inflation, it can use its two instruments to
attain bliss. Policy conflicts can arise when each group of authorities has
three target variables as shown by Sachs and Oudiz (1984), who assume
that each group of authorities has as target variables unemployment,
inflation, and the current account. Introducing capital mobility and adding
fiscal policy are both worthwhile objectives, but there are advantages to
pursuing them in sequence rather than simultaneously.
NOTES
IThe deviation forms of equations (1) through (12) are obtained by subtracting
each equation with the disturbances set equal to zero from the same equation
with the disturbances free to take on any value.
2 Rogoff(1983) points out this implication of the assumption that the monetary
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COMMENT GEORGES DE MENIL
Cc
This is a very good paper with which to start this conference because it pr
puts the basic issues on the table in a condensed and powerful way. My Ec
remarks will fail into three parts: na
(1) a discussion of the basic framework of Corden's study. pa
(2) comments on the key points of his analysis and conclusions; and no
(3) a remark on some of the interesting uses to which one might put mi
this model. . fo
I Framework
This is essentially a two-country model of the short-run determi- an
nation of income and output in a world in which prices and particularly
wages adjust with lags. Output is essentially demand determined, but re
supply considerations imply a short-run Phillips-like relationship in each au
country between employment and the rate of inflation. There are three co
transmission mechanisms operating between countries —thetraditional th
Keynesian trade multiplier, 'relative price' effects on the trade balance, and
inflation spillovers from one country to another. Corden's view of the
effects that inflation in one country has on another are interesting and to
provocative, and I shall have something specifically to say about that. We
are in a pure floating regime and trade is assumed to be in balance at all in4'.
times. There are —andthisis an important point —nocapital flows
between the two countries. Monetary and fiscal policy act on output and
inflation in each country but interest rates are completely decoupled.
Corden presents this as a limitation of the analysis and discusses how
the model can be extended to cover this lacuna. But I would like to turnOn transmission and coordination 33
this aspect of the model to good advantage by arguing that, as it stands,
the model is a useful representation of the coordination problem in Europe,
particularly on the Continent. As we know, extensive capital controls
significantly limit capital flows in and out of France and Italy in the short
rs run. In thinking of coordination between these two countries and the
Deutsch Mark zone, it may be a useful first approximation to think of their
interdependence as operating primarily through the trade account and
ye inflation effects. In what follows, I shall therefore use Germany and France
r rather than Germany and the United States as prototypes of two countries
exploring the possibility of economic cooperation.
ry,
II Analysis and Conclusions
Parr!
I shall treat, in sucession, the first and second parts of the paper.
Corden starts with a simple, short-run static model which was first
•it presented as a seminar paper of the Stockholm Institute of International
k
EconomicStudies. In this first half of the paper, he carefully dissects the
nature of the transmission mechanisms which operate through trade flows,
paying particular attention to terms of trade effects. He argues that under
• normal conditions there will be a positive transmission of employment
ut increases in one country to employment increases in another. The channel
for this to which he pays the most attention operates in the following
manner: expansion of employment and output in one country (say
Germany) tends to improve the terms of trade in the other (say France)
and thus, by raising real incomes, reduce the gap between the aspiration
ly real wage of employees and the actual real wage. Reduction of this gap
Ut reduces inflationary pressures, and makes it possible for the French
authorities to achieve any given level of employment at a lesser inflationary
cost. The government actually takes the gains from this improvement in
al the short-run Phillips-like trade-off between inflation and unemployment
partly in lower inflation and partly in more employment. Therefore
ie employment rises in France. It is important to note, and Corden is the first
to point this out, that it is not inevitable that expansion in Germany
improve the terms of trade in France. In the presence of homothetic
ill indifference curves, equiproportional expansion in the vector of outputs,
vs would, for instance, leave the terms of trade unchanged. If the terms of
trade go the other way, as they might but are unlikely to, that positive
transmissionmechanismwouldbecomeanegativetransmission
w mechanism.
It seems to me that, since Corden is not in a full employment world,34 Comment by Georges de Menu
he could also have appealed to the traditional international trade multiplier ad
asanadditionalimportantfactortendingtoproducepositive we
transmission. dei
Whether the transmission is positive or negative is, of course, extremely
important. It determines the nature of the loss from uncooperative fu:
behavior and the qualitative direction of the action cooperation calls for. fo:
If transmission is positive in nature, if the structure presents what to
Canzoneri and Gray (1983) have earlier called a 'locomotive' configuration ea
(Corden uses the same term), then uncooperative behavior will have a ' th
deflationary bias. If, on the other hand, the transmission is negative, or ar
the structure is what Canzoneri and Gray have called 'beggar thy
neighbor', then non-cooperative behavior can have an inflationary bias. is
In his conclusions to this section, Corden suggests some rules that could,
short of full coordination, bring France and Germany closer to their
contract curve. One of these is his interesting 'unilateral expansion rule'.
It is fair to point out, that, if the transmission mechanism turned out to
be negative, this rule would have an inflationary bias, and would thus not
be a Pareto improvement.
in
Part II
Economists frequently include the rate of inflation in government
preference functions without thinking twice about it. In this part of his
paper, Corden addresses the relation between inflation and welfare in an
interdependent world in a provocative way.
In part!, inflation played no direct role in the architecture of transmission, E4
because flexible exchange rates and purchasing power parity were assumed to•
to insulate Germany's inflation from France's inflation and vice versa.
In part II, Corden argues that inflation can only be a 'good' or 'bad'
if it has real effects. If inflation is an argument of government welfare
functions, it must be because governments believe that an increase in
inflation today reduces output in the future. The link may operate through
efficiency considerations, or through the unsustainability of high inflation,
but, in either case, the argument is essentially an intertemporal one about ml
the relationship between output and employment in the present and future. tel
Corden therefore proceeds to formulate the relation between present and ta4,
future employment, and present and future welfare within each country.
He demonstrates that this new intertemporal structure can generate
negative transmission mechanisms. tli
Personally, I would rather put the rate of inflation directly in the
government preference functions. Static models such as this one are
simplified representations of the world of uncertainty in which we live. In
this real world, an increase in the rate of inflation generates a degree ofOn transmission and coordination 35
icr additional uncertainty about real incomes and their distribution which may
ive weigh on welfare, and therefore be of concern to governments, indepen-
dently of considerations of efficiency and loss of future output.
ely If one retains inflation in the government's preference function, and
lye further drops the assumption of purchasing power parity, thus allowing
or for direct price effects, one obtains a price transmission mechanism similar
to the one in Canzonen and Gray and similar analyses. Such models can
easily produce scenarios dominated by negative transmission. The 'beggar
a thy neighbor' aspects of real exchange rate appreciation in such models
or are well known.
thy In short, this complicated construct in the second part of Corden's paper
as. is not required to produce Corden's result.
ild,
ieir HI Ramifications
Ic'. Corden makes a number of thought provoking suggestions at the
to end of this paper about the broad implications of the model and
•not possibilitiesfor extending it. He observes that the Nash solution is
particularly myopic when there are only two players. It is relatively simple
in such circumstances for the players to improve on the outcome. The gains
from cooperation are harder to achieve, and therefore more needing of
ent analysis, in a multi-country context. Corden says that the relevance of his
his model lies, therefore, more in the light that it throws on the more complex
an question of multilateral cooperation than in its direct applicability to
two-country relations. One example which comes to mind is that of the
on, European Community and the continuing tensions within it over efforts
to coalesce.
Corden also warns the reader about the hazards of fine-tuning. He
suggests that if the Phillips curves become vertical, cooperation may be
are limited by the irreconcilable real wage claims of unions in the two
in countries.
igh In his discussion of possible further developments, Corden makes one
surprising omission. The microeconomic structure which Corden has
)ut imbedded in his model is particularly suited for analysis of the inter-
re. relationships between money and budgets, on the one hand, and trade and
nd tariffs, on the other. In many instances, notably within the European
ry. Community, bargaining cuts across the boundaries between macroeco-
ate nomic and microeconomic policies. Adeficitcountry may, for instance,
threaten trade obstructions in an effort to persuade a surplus partner to
the reflate. One can hope that in further work Corden will take advantage of
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